

# History based flow analysis in the lambda calculus

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Jean-Jacques Lévy

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November 14, 2006

- ① Motivations
- ②  $\lambda$ -calculus, principals and independence
- ③  $\lambda$ -calculus and the Chinese Wall
- ④ Future works


# Motivations

# Security and Programming languages

- Restricting rights of downloaded programs is not sufficient...


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
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
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- ... since attackers can borrow privileges from local programs [Hardy].






# First approach : stack inspection

- Used in Java and C#.
- Before executing a sensitive action, one inspects the chain of function calls leading to that action.


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
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
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
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- Problem : there remains (indirect) ways of acting outside function calls [Fournet-Gordon].

**Navigateur**




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- Data are classified in several categories and their propagation is tracked during program execution.
- **Non-interference** : public output does not rely on secret inputs.
- Static analysis is do-able even on complete languages (FlowCaml, JIF).



## Third approach : the Chinese Wall


- Conflicts of interest in « economy » [Brewer-Nash].
- Alice and Bob compete for a contract ; Charlie is the buyer.
- Alice and Bob fix the price of the contract.
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
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
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<i>Safety policy</i>	<i>Safety property</i>
Stack Inspection	-
Flow Information	Non interference
Chinese Wall	?

Objectives :

- define the Chinese Wall in the  $\lambda$ -calculus.
- examine the safety property of the Chinese Wall policy.

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# $\lambda$ -calculus, principals and independence

# $\lambda_n$ -calculus : a $\lambda$ -calculus with principals

- Alice, Bob, Charlie are **principals**.

$A, B, \dots$

- Terms of  $\lambda_n$ -calculus :

$M, N ::= x$	<i>Variable</i>
$(\lambda x.M)^A$	<i>Abstraction</i>
$(MN)^A$	<i>Application</i>

- Values :

$V ::= (\lambda x.M)^A$

- **Remark** : **principals** differ from **labels** in the labelled  $\lambda$ -calculus.

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
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
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# Reduction in $\lambda_n$ -calculus


$$(\beta) \quad ((\lambda x.M)^A N)^B \rightarrow M\{x \setminus N\}$$




# An example of reduction in the $\lambda_n$ -calculus




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- Confluence
- Finite Developments
- Standardisation

# Reduction ignoring a principal

## Definition

The reduction  $M \xrightarrow{((\lambda x.N)^B P)^C} M'$  *ignores*  $A$  iff  $A \notin \{B, C\}$ .

- Also written  $M \xrightarrow{\neg A} M'$ .
- We write  $M \xrightarrow{\neg A} M'$  if every reduction step ignores  $A$ .


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
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
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
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
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- Actions of  $A$  and  $B$  are **independent** if they commute.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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




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
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
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
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
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


## Independence : example 1/2




This reduction is **not** independent of the interaction between  $A$  and  $B$ .

## Independence : example 2/2



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# The $\lambda_n$ -calculus : summary

- A  $\lambda$ -calculus with **principals**.
- A safety property : **independence**.
- How to express the Chinese Wall policy in the  $\lambda_n$ -calculus ?
  - ▶ This policy relies on history.
  - ▶ We use the labelled  $\lambda$ -calculus to track history of interactions.
- Which safety property is guaranteed by the Chinese Wall policy ?
  - ▶ We show that a reduction following the Chinese Wall policy between  $A$  and  $B$  is independent of the interaction between  $A$  and  $B$ .



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
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# $\lambda$ -calculus and the Chinese Wall

# The labelled $\lambda_n$ -calculus

Terms	$M, N ::= x$   $(\lambda x.N)^A$   $(MN)^A$   $a:M$
Atomic labels	$a, b ::= [\alpha] \mid [\alpha]$
Compound labels	$\alpha, \beta ::= Aa_1a_2 \cdots a_nB \quad n \geq 0$
Values	$V, W ::= (\lambda x.N)^A \mid a:V$


# Labelled reduction



$$(\beta) \quad R = (a_1 \dots a_n : (\lambda x.M)^B N)^A \rightarrow [\alpha] : M\{x \setminus [\alpha] : N\}$$
$$\alpha = A a_1 \dots a_n B$$

The redex name is  $\text{name}(R) = \alpha$ .


## Labelled reduction : an example



$(((\lambda x. (\lambda y. y)^C)^A z)^C z)^B$




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
$$(((\lambda x. (\lambda y. y)^C)^A z)^C z)^B \rightarrow ([CA] : (\lambda y. y)^C z)^B$$

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$$\begin{aligned} (((\lambda x. (\lambda y. y)^C)^A z)^C z)^B &\rightarrow ([CA] : (\lambda y. y)^C z)^B \\ &\rightarrow [B[CA]C] : [B[CA]C] : z \end{aligned}$$

# Independence and labels

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$$\text{Princ}(Aa_1 \dots a_n B) = \{A, B\} \cup_{1 \leq i \leq n} \text{Princ}(a_i)$$
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- ▶ Example :  $\text{Princ}(A \lceil B \lfloor AC \rfloor D \rceil E) = \{A, B, C, D, E\}$

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## Definition (Separation)

*A sequence of atomic labels  $a_1 \dots a_n$  separates the principals  $A$  and  $B$  iff, for every  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , we have  $\{A, B\} \not\subseteq \text{Princ}(a_i)$ .*



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- **Examples** :
  - ★  $\lceil AC \rceil \lfloor C \lceil DE \rceil B \rfloor$  separates  $A$  et  $B$ .
  - ★  $\lceil DC \rceil \lfloor C \lceil AE \rceil B \rfloor$  does not separate  $A$  et  $B$ .

# Independence and labels : separation


## Theorem (Separation)

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
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
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The head sequence  $[BC][AC][AC]$  separates  $A$  and  $B$ .

# Independence and separation


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
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
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


- ★ The label  $[\AA]$  separates  $A$  et  $B$ .
- ★ This reduction **is not** independent of the interaction between  $A$  and  $B$ .

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# Expressing Chinese Wall in the $\lambda_n$ -calculus

- The Chinese Wall between  $A$  and  $B$  is written  $CW(A, B)$ .
- If redex  $R$  has name  $Aa_1 \dots a_n B$ , then :
  - ▶  $A$  and  $B$  interact (directly).
  - ▶ If  $C \in \text{Princ}(a_i)$ , then  $C$  participated to the creation of this interaction.

## Definition (Chinese Wall)

*A reduction follows  $CW(A, B)$  iff every redex  $R$  contracted by this reduction is such that :*

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
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# Chinese Wall in the $\lambda_n$ -calculus : example 1/2




$$\text{Princ}(\text{name}(R_1)) = \{A, C\}$$

$$\text{Princ}(\text{name}(R_2)) = \{A, B, C\}$$

This reduction **does not follow**  $CW(A, B)$ .

## Chinese Wall in the $\lambda_n$ -calculus : example 2/2



$$\text{Princ}(\text{name}(R_1)) = \{A, C\}$$


$$\text{Princ}(\text{name}(R_2)) = \{B, C\}$$

This reduction follows  $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ .

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$

## Theorem (Correction)


If  $R : M \rightarrow N$  follows  $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ , then  $R$  is independent of the interaction between  $A$  and  $B$ .



The Chinese Wall guarantees the independence.




# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : example



The reduction follows  $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ ...

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : example



...hence it is independent of the interaction between  $A$  and  $B$

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof

- Sublabel of a compound label :

$$\alpha \preceq \alpha$$

$$\alpha \preceq Aa_1 \dots a_n B \text{ si } \exists i . a_i = [\beta] \text{ and } \alpha \preceq \beta$$

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$$M \xrightarrow{S_1} \xrightarrow{S_2} \xrightarrow{S_3} \cdots \xrightarrow{S_n} N$$

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For  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , we write  $\alpha_i = \text{name}(S_i)$ .

We have  $\{A, B\} \cap \text{Princ}(\alpha_i) \neq \{A, B\}$ .

## Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof

$$\begin{array}{c} M \xrightarrow{S_1} \xrightarrow{S_2} \xrightarrow{S_3} \cdots \xrightarrow{S_n} N \\ \alpha_1 \Downarrow \\ \alpha_2 \Downarrow \\ \alpha_3 \Downarrow \\ \vdots \\ \alpha_n \Downarrow \\ N_1 \end{array} \quad R$$

$R_1$

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
$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 M & \xrightarrow{S_1} & \xrightarrow{S_2} & \xrightarrow{S_3} & \cdots & \xrightarrow{S_n} & N \\
 \alpha_1 \Downarrow & & & & & & \\
 \alpha_2 \Downarrow & & & & & & \\
 R_1 \alpha_3 \Downarrow & & & & & & \\
 \vdots & & & & & & \\
 \alpha_n \Downarrow & & & & & & \\
 N_1 & \xrightarrow{R/R_1} & & & & & \gg
 \end{array}$$

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


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


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
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
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## Lemma (Reordering)

If  $R : M \xRightarrow{\alpha_1} \cdots \xRightarrow{\alpha_n} N$ , there is a reduction  $R' : M \xRightarrow{\beta_1} \cdots \xRightarrow{\beta_m} N'$  such that

- (1)  $\{\beta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq m} \subseteq \{\alpha_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq n}$     (2) if  $i < j$ , then  $\beta_j \not\prec \beta_i$     (3)  $R \leq R'$

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof



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
We have  $\{A, B\} \cap \text{Princ}(\alpha_i) \neq \{A, B\}$ .

## Lemma (Reordering)

If  $R : M \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_n} N$ , there is a reduction  $R' : M \xrightarrow{\beta_1} \dots \xrightarrow{\beta_m} N'$  such that


- (1)  $\{\beta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq m} \subseteq \{\alpha_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq n}$     (2) if  $i < j$ , then  $\beta_j \not\prec \beta_i$     (3)  $R \leq R'$

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof



- If  $i < j$ , we have  $\beta_j \not\prec \beta_i$ .
- $\{\gamma_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq k}$  : elements of  $\{\beta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$  such that  $\{A, B\} \cap \text{Princ}(\beta_i) = \emptyset$ .
- $\{\delta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq k'}$  : elements of  $\{\beta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq m}$  such that  $\{A, B\} \cap \text{Princ}(\beta_i) \neq \emptyset$ .
- If  $\beta_i \in \{\delta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq k'}$ , if  $\beta_j \in \{\gamma_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq k}$ , we have  $\beta_i \not\prec \beta_j$ .

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof




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


# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof



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


- If  $i < j$  and  $\beta_i \in \{\delta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq k'}$  and  $\beta_j \in \{\gamma_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq k}$ , we have  $\beta_i \not\sim \beta_j$  and  $\beta_j \not\sim \beta_i$ .

Lemma (Permutation)

If  $\alpha \not\sim \beta$  and  $\beta \not\sim \alpha$  and if  $R_1 : M \xrightarrow{\alpha} \xRightarrow{\beta} N$ , then we have  $R_2 : M \xRightarrow{\beta} \xrightarrow{\alpha} N$  and  $R_1 \sim R_2$ .

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof





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



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

If  $\alpha \not\sim \beta$  and  $\beta \not\sim \alpha$  and if  $R_1 : M \xrightarrow{\alpha} \xrightarrow{\beta} N$ , then we have  $R_2 : M \xrightarrow{\beta} \xrightarrow{\alpha} N$  and  $R_1 \sim R_2$ .

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof





- $\{\eta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq p}$  : elements of  $\{\delta_i\}_i$  such that  $\{A, B\} \cap \text{Princ}(\delta_i) = \{A\}$ .
- $\{\theta_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq p'}$  : elements of  $\{\delta_i\}_i$  such that  $\{A, B\} \cap \text{Princ}(\delta_i) = \{B\}$ .
- For every  $i, j$ , we have  $\eta_i \neq \theta_j$  and  $\theta_j \neq \eta_i$ .

# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof




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
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



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



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# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof



# Correction of $\mathcal{CW}(A, B)$ : proof



# $\lambda$ -calculus and Chinese Wall : summary


- ① Safety property : independence
- ② Correspondence between labelled lambda calculus and independence

<i>Safety policy</i>	<i>Safety property</i>
Stack inspection	-
Information flow	Non interference
Chinese Wall	Independence


# Future works

- 1 Static information flow in the  $\lambda$ -calculus
  - ▶ labelled  $\lambda$ -calculus and DCC [Riecke], FlowCaml as [Simonet, Pottier], DCC+ [Abadi], etc
- 2 Reduction strategies
  - ▶ call-by-value  $\lambda$ -calculus
  - ▶ weak  $\lambda$ -calculus
- 3 Adding delta rules
  - ▶ Imperative features and exceptions
  - ▶ Safety rules (safety operators : uses or binds)
- 4 Concurrent features
  - ▶ Permutation equivalence and Event structures
  - ▶ Reversible processes (backtracking) [Jean Krivine]

# Conclusion : non interference




- Non interference : the labels of the  $\lambda$ -calculus express **functional interference**.
- In the  $\lambda$ -calculus with references, labels have to also capture **interference with memory**.
  - ▶ A memory cell interferes within some time **interval**.




- ▶ We can use irreversibility of contexts in the labelled  $\lambda$ -calculus [Blanc].

# Conclusion : non interference




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
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


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
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# Conclusion : independence




- 1 Created principals and extended independence.
- 2 Link between non-interference and independence : express these properties within a common framework.
- 3 Dynamic labels are a good starting point for an analysis mixing static and dynamic checks.
- 4 Simple proofs for safety properties.

# Conclusion : independence




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