#### Playing spy games in Iris

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Innia



#### • Local generic solvers

- Spying: implementation and specification of modulus
- Spying: verification of modulus
- The conjunction rule
- Conclusion
- Bibliography

A family of related algorithms for computing the *least solution* of a system of recursive equations:

- Le Charlier and Van Hentenryck (1992).
- Vergauwen and Lewi (1994).
- Fecht and Seidl (1999) coin the term "local generic solver".
- F. P. (2009) releases Fix and asks how to *verify* it.

A solver computes the *least fixed point* of a user-supplied monotone second-order function:

type valuation = variable -> property
val lfp: (valuation -> valuation) -> valuation

lfp eqs returns a function phi that purports to be the least fixed point. We are interested in on-demand, incremental, memoizing solvers.

Nothing is computed until phi is applied to a variable v. Minimal work is then performed: the least fixed point is computed at v and at the variables that v depends upon. It is memoized to avoid recomputation. Dependencies are discovered at runtime via *spying*.

- F. P. (2009) offers the verification of a local generic solver as a *challenge*.Why is it difficult?
- A solver offers a pure API, yet uses mutable internal state:
  - for memoization use a lock and its invariant;

- F. P. (2009) offers the verification of a local generic solver as a *challenge*.Why is it difficult?
- A solver offers a pure API, yet uses mutable internal state:
  - for memoization use a lock and its invariant;
  - for *spying* on the user-supplied function eqs.



In short, we want a *modular* specification in higher-order separation logic:

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{E} \text{ is monotone } \Rightarrow \\ \{eqs \ implements \ flip \ \mathcal{E}\} \\ lfp \ eqs \\ \{get. \ get \ implements \ \bar{\mu} \mathcal{E}\} \end{array}$ 

 $\bar{\mu}\mathcal{E}$  is the optimal least fixed point of  $\mathcal{E}$ .



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The essence of spying can be distilled in a single combinator, modulus, so named by Longley (1999).

The call "modulus ff f" returns a pair of

- the result of the call "ff f", and
- the list of arguments with which ff has queried f during this call.

This is a complete list of points on which ff depends.

### Implementation of modulus

Here is a simple-minded imperative implementation of modulus:

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs = ref [] in
  let spy x =
      (* Record a dependency on x: *)
      xs := x :: !xs;
      (* Forward the call to f: *)
      f x
    in
  let c = ff spy in
  (c, !xs)
```

Longley (1999) gives this code and claims (without proof) that it has the desired denotational semantics in the setting of a pure  $\lambda$ -calculus.

What is a plausible specification of modulus?

$$\{f \text{ implements } \phi * ff \text{ implements } \mathcal{F} \}$$
  
modulus ff f  
$$\{(c, ws). \ \lceil c = \mathcal{F}(\phi) \rceil \}$$

The postcondition means that c is the result of the call "ff f"...

"*f implements*  $\phi$ " is sugar for the triple  $\forall x. \{true\} f x \{y, [y = \phi(x)]\}$ . "*ff implements*  $\mathcal{F}$ " means  $\forall f, \phi$ . {*f implements*  $\phi$ } *ff f* {*c*. [*c* =  $\mathcal{F}(\phi)$ ]}. What is a plausible specification of modulus?

{f implements  $\phi * \text{ff implements } \mathcal{F}$ } modulus ff f {(c, ws).  $[\forall \phi'. \phi' =_{ws} \phi \Rightarrow c = \mathcal{F}(\phi')]$ }

The postcondition means that *c* is the result of the call "ff f"... and that *c* does not depend on the values taken by *f* outside of the list ws. "*f* implements  $\phi$ " is sugar for the triple  $\forall x. \{true\} f x \{y. [y = \phi(x)]\}$ . "*ff* implements  $\mathcal{F}$ " means  $\forall f, \phi$ . {*f* implements  $\phi$ } *ff f* {*c*. [*c* =  $\mathcal{F}(\phi)$ ]}.



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# Why verifying modulus seems challenging

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs = ref [] in
  let spy x =
    xs := x :: !xs; f x
  in let c = ff spy in
  (c, !xs)
```

 $\{ f \text{ implements } \phi * ff \text{ implements } \mathcal{F} \} \\ modulus ff f \\ \{ (c, ws). \ [\forall \phi'. \phi' =_{ws} \phi \Rightarrow c = \mathcal{F}(\phi') ] \}$ 

ff expects an *apparently pure* function as an argument, so we *must* prove "spy implements  $\phi$ " for some  $\phi$ , and we will get  $c = \mathcal{F}(\phi')$ . However,

- Proving c = F(φ') for one function φ' is not good enough. It seems as though as we need spy to implement all functions φ' at once.
- The set of functions φ' over which we would like to quantify is not known in advance — it depends on ws, a result of modulus.
- What invariant describes xs? *Only in the end* does it hold a *complete* list ws of dependencies.

- We need *spy* to implement all functions  $\phi'$  at once...
- The list ws is not known in advance...
- What invariant describes xs?

- We need spy to implement all functions  $\phi'$  at once...
  - Use a conjunction rule to focus on one function  $\phi^\prime$  at a time.
- The list ws is not known in advance...
- What invariant describes xs?

- We need *spy* to implement all functions  $\phi'$  at once...
  - Use a *conjunction rule* to focus on one function  $\phi'$  at a time.
- The list ws is not known in advance...
  - Use a *prophecy variable* to name this list ahead of time.
- What invariant describes xs?

- We need *spy* to implement all functions  $\phi'$  at once...
  - Use a *conjunction rule* to focus on one function  $\phi'$  at a time.
- The list ws is not known in advance...
  - Use a *prophecy variable* to name this list ahead of time.
- What invariant describes xs?
  - The elements currently recorded in !xs, concatenated with those that will be recorded in the future, form the list ws.

In Hoare Logic and Separation Logic, assertions describe the *current* state.

• e.g., "at this point, !xs is the empty list []"

The current state, possibly enriched with *ghost state*, reflects the *past*. There is no way of talking about the *future!*  In Hoare Logic and Separation Logic, assertions describe the *current* state.

• e.g., "at this point, !xs is the empty list []"

The current state, possibly enriched with *ghost state*, reflects the *past*. There is no way of talking about the *future*!

Enter *prophecy variables* (Abadi and Lamport 1988; Jung et al. 2020).

# A prophecy variable primer

A *ghost variable* with three operations: allocation, assignment, disposal. The reasoning rules allow referring to the sequence *xs* of *future writes*.

PROPHECY ALLOCATION {true} newProph() {p. ∃xs. p will receive xs} PROPHECY ASSIGNMENT {p will receive xs} resolveProph p x{().  $\exists xs'$ .  $\begin{bmatrix} xs = x :: xs' \end{bmatrix}$ p will receive xs'}

PROPHECY DISPOSAL {p will receive xs} disposeProph p {(). [xs = []]} Instead of establishing this *strong* specification for modulus...

$$\left( \begin{array}{c} \{f \text{ implements } \phi * ff \text{ implements } \mathcal{F} \} \\ modulus \ ff \ f \\ \{(c, ws). \ [\forall \phi'. \ \phi' =_{ws} \phi \Rightarrow c = \mathcal{F}(\phi')] \} \end{array} \right)$$

$$\forall \phi'. \left( \begin{array}{c} \{f \text{ implements } \phi * ff \text{ implements } \mathcal{F} \} \\ modulus ff f \\ \{(c, ws). \left[ \phi' =_{ws} \phi \Rightarrow c = \mathcal{F}(\phi') \right] \} \end{array} \right)$$

...let us first establish a *weaker* specification.

Then (later), use an infinitary *conjunction rule* to argue (roughly) that the weaker spec implies the stronger one.

Assume  $\phi'$  is given.

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
  let spy x =
    let y = f x in
    withLock lk (fun () ->
        xs := x :: !xs; resolveProph p x);
    y
  in
  let c = ff spy in
  acquireLock lk; disposeProph p; (c, !xs)
```

Step 1. Allocate a prophecy variable p. Introduce the name *ws* to stand for the list of *future writes* to p.

Assume  $\phi'$  is given.

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
  let spy x =
    let y = f x in
    withLock lk (fun () ->
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    in
  let c = ff spy in
    acquireLock lk; disposeProph p; (c, !xs)
```

Step 2. Allocate a lock lk, which owns xs and p. Its invariant is that the list ws of *all writes* to p can be split into two parts:

- the *past writes*, the reverse of the current contents of *xs*;
- the remaining *future writes* to *p*.

Assume  $\phi'$  is given.

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
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Step 2. Allocate a lock lk, which owns xs and p. Its invariant is that the list ws of *all writes* to p can be split into two parts:

- the *past writes*, the reverse of the current contents of *xs*;
- the remaining *future writes* to *p*.

Moving x from one part to the other preserves the invariant. -

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    withLock lk (fun () ->
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    y
    in
  let c = ff spy in
    acquireLock lk; disposeProph p; (c, !xs)
```

Because *acquireLock* exhales the invariant and *disposeProph* guarantees there are no more future writes, !*xs* on the last line yields *ws* (reversed).

Thus, the name ws in the postcondition of *modulus* and the name ws introduced by *newProph* denote *the same set* of points.

Assume  $\phi'$  is given.

```
let modulus ff f =
   let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
   let spy x =
      let y = f x in
      withLock lk (fun () ->
        xs := x :: !xs; resolveProph p x);
   y
   in
   let c = ff spy in
   acquireLock lk; disposeProph p; (c, !xs)
```

Step 3. Reason by cases:

- If φ' =<sub>ws</sub> φ does not hold, then the postcondition of modulus is true. Then, it suffices to prove that modulus is safe, which is not difficult.
- If  $\phi' =_{ws} \phi$  does hold, continue on to the next slides...

Assume  $\phi'$  is given. Assume  $\phi' =_{ws} \phi$  holds.

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
  let spy x =
    let y = f x in
    withLock lk (fun () ->
        xs := x :: !xs; resolveProph p x);
    y
    in
    let c = ff spy in
    acquireLock lk; disposeProph p; (c, !xs)
```

Step 4. Prove that *spy implements*  $\phi'$ .

• We have  $y = \phi(x)$ . We wish to prove  $y = \phi'(x)$ .

Assume  $\phi'$  is given. Assume  $\phi' =_{ws} \phi$  holds.

```
let modulus ff f =
   let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
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Step 4. Prove that *spy implements*  $\phi'$ .

- We have  $y = \phi(x)$ . We wish to prove  $y = \phi'(x)$ .
- Because  $\phi$  and  $\phi'$  coincide on *ws*, the goal boils down to  $x \in ws$ .

Assume  $\phi'$  is given. Assume  $\phi' =_{ws} \phi$  holds.

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let modulus ff f =
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```

Step 4. Prove that *spy implements*  $\phi'$ .

- We have  $y = \phi(x)$ . We wish to prove  $y = \phi'(x)$ .
- Because  $\phi$  and  $\phi'$  coincide on *ws*, the goal boils down to  $x \in ws$ .
- $x \in ws$  holds because we make it hold by writing x to p.

- "there, let me bend reality for you"

Assume  $\phi'$  is given. Assume  $\phi' =_{ws} \phi$  holds.

```
let modulus ff f =
  let xs, p, lk = ref [], newProph(), newLock() in
  let spy x =
    let y = f x in
    withLock lk (fun () ->
        xs := x :: !xs; resolveProph p x);
    y
    in
  let c = ff spy in
    acquireLock lk; disposeProph p; (c, !xs)
```

Step 5. From "*ff implements*  $\mathcal{F}$ " and "*spy implements*  $\phi$ '", deduce that the call "*ff spy*" is permitted and that  $c = \mathcal{F}(\phi')$  holds.

 $c = \mathcal{F}(\phi')$  is the postcondition of *modulus*. We are done!



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Recall that, from this *weak* specification of *modulus*...

$$\forall \phi'. \left( \begin{array}{c} \{f \text{ implements } \phi * ff \text{ implements } \mathcal{F} \} \\ modulus ff f \\ \{(c, ws). \left[ \phi' =_{ws} \phi \Rightarrow c = \mathcal{F}(\phi') \right] \} \end{array} \right)$$

$$\left( \begin{array}{c} \{f \text{ implements } \phi * ff \text{ implements } \mathcal{F} \} \\ modulus \ ff \ f \\ \{(c, ws). \ [\forall \phi'. \ \phi' =_{ws} \phi \Rightarrow c = \mathcal{F}(\phi')] \} \end{array} \right)$$

...we need to deduce this *stronger* specification.

This is where an infinitary *conjunction rule* is needed.

# An array of conjunction rules

BINARY, NON-DEPENDENT
$\{P\} \ e \ \{\ \ \lceil Q_1 \rceil\}$
$\{P\} \in \{\_, \lceil Q_2 \rceil\}$
$\overline{\{P\} \ e \ \{\ \ \lceil Q_1 \land Q_2 \rceil\}}$
Infinitary, Non-Dependent

INFINITARY, NON-DEPENDENT  $\frac{\forall x. \{P\} e \{ \_, [Qx] \}}{\{P\} e \{ \_, [\forall x.Qx] \}}$  BINARY, DEPENDENT  $\begin{cases}
P \\ e \\ y. [Q_1 y] \\
P \\ e \\ y. [Q_2 y] \\
\end{cases}$   $\{P \\ e \\ y. [Q_1 y \land Q_2 y] \\
\end{cases}$ 

INFINITARY, DEPENDENT  $\frac{\forall x. \{P\} e \{y. \lceil Q \times y \rceil\}}{\{P\} e \{y. \lceil \forall x. Q \times y \rceil\}}$ 

The non-dependent variants are *sound*.

The dependent variants may be sound (*open question!*). We can derive an approximation that's good enough for our purposes.

# An unsound conjunction rule

All of the previous rules are restricted to *pure* postconditions.

An unrestricted conjunction rule is *unsound* in the presence of ghost state.

IMPURE (UNSOUND!)  $\{P\} \in \{., Q_1\}$  $\{P\} \in \{., Q_2\}$  $\{P\} \in \{ ..., Q_1 \land Q_2 \}$ 

**Open question!** 

Would this rule be sound if every ghost update was apparent in the code?

# Hypothesis: $\forall x. \{P\} e \{\_, [Qx]\}$ Goal: $\{P\} e \{\_, [\forall x. Qx]\}$

{*P*}

$$\{P\}$$
Case split:  $(\forall x. Q x) \lor (\exists x. \neg Q x)$ 

$$\{P\}$$
Case split:  $(\forall x. Q x) \lor (\exists x. \neg Q x)$ 

$$\{P * [\forall x. Q x]\}$$

$$e$$

$$\{[\forall x. Q x]\}$$

$$\{P\}$$
Case split:  $(\forall x. Q x) \lor (\exists x. \neg Q x)$ 

$$\{P * [\forall x. Q x]\}$$

$$e$$

$$\{[\forall x. Q x]\}$$

$$\{P\}$$
Case split:  $(\forall x. Q x) \lor (\exists x. \neg Q x)$ 

$$\{P * [\exists x. \neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{P * [\exists x. Q x]\}$$

$$\{P * [\exists x. \neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{\exists x. P * [\neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{\exists x. [Q x] * [\neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{P\}$$
Case split:  $(\forall x. Q x) \lor (\exists x. \neg Q x)$ 

$$\{P * [\exists x. \neg Q x]\}$$

$$e$$

$$\{[\forall x. Q x]\}$$

$$\{P * [\exists x. \neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{\exists x. P * [\neg Q x]\}$$

$$e$$

$$\{\exists x. [Q x] * [\neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{false\}$$

$$\{P\}$$
Case split:  $(\forall x. Q x) \lor (\exists x. \neg Q x)$ 

$$\{P * [\exists x. \neg Q x]\}$$

$$e$$

$$\{[\forall x. Q x]\}$$

$$\{P * [\exists x. \neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{\exists x. P * [\neg Q x]\}$$

$$e$$

$$\{\exists x. [Q x] * [\neg Q x]\}$$

$$\{false\}$$

$$\{[\forall x. Q x]\}$$

Same idea, but a *prophecy variable* must be used to name y ahead of time and allow the case split  $(\forall x. Q \times y) \lor \neg(\forall x. Q \times y)$ .

INFINITARY, DEPENDENT  $\frac{\forall x. \{P\} e \{y. [Q x y]\}}{\{P\} e' \{y. [\forall x. Q x y]\}}$ 

Because of this, e' in the conclusion is a copy of e instrumented with *newProph* and *resolveProph* instructions. (Ouch.)



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- Extension of Iris's prophecy API: *disposeProph*; typed prophecies.
- Proof of the conjunction rule.
- Specification and proof of *modulus*.
- Specification and proof of a slightly simplified version of Fix:

```
 \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{E} \text{ is monotone } \Rightarrow \\ \{ eqs \ implements \ flip \ \mathcal{E} \} \\ lfp \ eqs \\ \{ get. \ get \ implements \ \bar{\mu} \mathcal{E} \} \end{array}
```

where  $\bar{\mu}\mathcal{E}$  is the optimal least fixed point of  $\mathcal{E}$ .

A few optimizations are missing, e.g.,

• Fix uses a more efficient representation of the dependency graph.

Caveats:

- Termination is not proved.
- Deadlock-freedom is not proved.

Wishes:

• Is there any way of *not* polluting the code with operations on prophecy variables?

#### Take-home messages

Spying is another archetypical use of hidden state. Prophecy variables are fun, and they can be useful not just in concurrent code, but also in sequential code.



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